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Abstract—Key reconciliation procedures are needed to correct
key differences that can arise as a consequence of independent
noise at the two ends of a reciprocal link. We assume a line-of-
sight channel and use reconﬁgurable antenna elements to ran-
domize it, such that it allows for key generation. The Linde-Buzo-
Gray algorithm is employed to quantize the complex channel
transfer characteristic, and adaptive guard bands, symmetric to
the quantization thresholds, are further constructed. To limit the
number of key errors, we ensure that only the points that fall
outside the guard band interval are accepted for key generation.
The steps for constructing the guard bands are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
We consider a type of physical layer key generation re-
quiring the channel to be reciprocal [1]–[6], meaning that
both directions of a duplex channel will observe the same
channel characteristics in amplitude and phase, assuming a
ﬂat fading channel for simplicity. Quantized measurements of
the complex channel gain are almost identical at Alice’s and
Bob’s end, only different due to statistically independent noise
and resulting differences of the quantization results, ignoring
differences in the analog circuitry.
An eavesdropper (Eve) will ideally experience completely
different channels to Alice and Bob making it impossible
to recover the same key.1 In case of a mobile environment,
the changing channel properties will enable frequent gener-
ation of new keys. Under stationary line-of-sight conditions,
other measures have to be taken to randomize the channel.
Reconﬁgurable antenna arrays allow for such randomization
even achieving almost complex Gaussian properties in case
of bigger antenna arrays. In this work, we make use of
simulated data for such an antenna array, for space limitations
concentrating on the almost Gaussian case, only.
Since the uncorrelated noise on both sides may lead to
different keys, a key reconciliation procedure will be essential
for the practical use of such physical layer key generation.
One possible approach is the use of guard bands instead of
quantization thresholds, wherein measured data is discarded.
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1A man-in-the-middle attack is discussed in [7].
In here, we design such guard bands and study bit-error ratios
and efﬁciencies.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section in-
troduced reconﬁgurable antennas, followed by a short in-
troduction to vector quantization with the Linde-Buzo-Gray
algorithm in Section III. The guard band construction process
is introduced in Section IV while the results and their inter-
pretation are discussed in Section V. The paper is concluded
in Section VI.
II. RECAP ANTENNAS FOR CHANNEL RANDOMIZATION
The term reconﬁgurable aperture antenna (RECAP) [8]
refers to a regular array of reconﬁgurable elements (REs)
conﬁned to a physical aperture. RECAPs can be used in a wide
variety of applications, such as beamforming, interference
suppression, and channel capacity and security enhancement
[9], [10].
In this work, we consider using a parasitic RECAP at one of
the communicating nodes (Alice) to generate artiﬁcial fading
in a stationary line-of-sight (LOS) environment, i.e., it creates
a time-variant “mobile” environment also during times, when
this cannot be guaranteed by the channel itself. The parasitic
RECAP consists of a 5× 5 square array of half-wave dipoles
conﬁned to an area of 1λ× 1λ in the xy plane and height of
λ/2 in the z direction as shown in Fig. 1. The center element
acts as a feed element while others are parasitic antennas
loaded with REs. REs are assumed to consist of variable
capacitances, such that the reﬂection coefﬁcient presented at
the kth RE port is Γk = exp(jαk), where αk is continuously
distributed over [−180◦, 0]. The other node (Bob) is equipped
with a single dipole.
A. RECAP Simulation
In order to characterize RECAP channel statistics, we need
to simulate thousands of possible RECAP states, which is
computationally expensive using full-wave simulation. Instead,
a hybrid approach is used, where full wave simulation is
combined with network analysis, providing fast as well as
accurate simulation results [11].
B. Channel Characterization
In our analysis, we have considered the azimuthal radiation
pattern (φ = π/2) and a line-of-sight scenario (θ = 0). The
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Fig. 1. Perspective view of dipole array RECAP
channel between Bob and Alice can be written as
ha,raw = E
mc
RX(0, π/2) α E
mc
TX(0, π/2) , (1)
where α is the path gain, EmcRX is the matched (Z0-terminated)
radiation pattern of Alice’s RECAP obtained using the hybrid
analysis, and EmcTX is the Bob’s matched radiation pattern
which is assumed to be constant. Note that the channel ha,raw
does not take the effect of noise into account. Synthetic fading
is created by randomly changing the state of each RE in Alice’s
RECAP, which in return changes EmcRX and ha,raw.
In order to apply quantization schemes, we normalize the
channel with respect to its mean power and remove the effect
of the complex channel mean, which can be expressed as
ha =
ha,raw − E{ha,raw}√
E|ha|2
, (2)
where E{.} denotes expectation, and ha,raw and ha represent
vectors of raw and processed channels between Alice and Bob.
III. VECTOR QUANTIZATION
Having obtained the channel measurement data, the next
step is the quantization process. We opted for the Linde-Buzo-
Gray (LBG) algorithm [12], a 2-dimensional vector quantizer
which represents a sample version of the Lloyd-Max quantizer
[13]. One might also go for two scalar quantizers for circularly
symmetric distributions as in [14], albeit suboptimum. For very
irregular distributions resulting from a small number of REs,
this is not an option.
Just as the Lloyd-Max quantizer, the LBG algorithm re-
duced the Euclidean distortion measure and is centered around
two steps, namely a nearest-neighbor step that leads to the
Voronoi regions and a centroid step that determines the rep-
resentative code-book vectors. Hence, to just shortly provide
the steps, they are given by
Sn =
{
xm : ‖xm − cn‖2 ≤ ‖xm − cn′‖2 ∀n′ = n
}
, (3)
for the Voronoi regions and the given code-book vectors
cn. The code-book vectors themselves are determined as the
average of the data with a Voronoi region (conditional mean)
cn =
∑
xm∈Sn xm∑
xm∈Sn 1
∀ n = 1, 2, · · · , N . (4)
The vector quantization is described in more detail in [15].
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF GUARD BANDS
As already mentioned previously, the reciprocity of the
channel between Alice and Bob allows the two to have access
to the same magnitude and phase of the channel. This comes
with a great advantage since it ensures that generating keys
using vector quantization based on the channel measurements
will permit both Alice and Bob to have almost the same key.
The only factor that can intervene and lead to slightly different
keys on the two sides of the channel is the noise, independent
at the two ends. In here, we ignore non-symmetries of the
circuitry at Alice and Bob as a further possible source of incon-
sistencies and possible countermeasures, just as corrections of
different non-linearities etc.. Measures that need to be taken to
avoid the difference in keys are addressed as key reconciliation
techniques.
For this paper, we study the possibility of introducing
guard bands instead of just the normal quantization thresholds
that delimit the different encoding regions to support key
reconciliation. To this end, any point that will end up in the
guard band region will not be used for generating keys. We
consider variable-width guard bands, such that, at regions with
a small probability of occurrence, the guard bands will be
narrower than at regions with high probability. For a complex
Gaussian channel this strategy would lead to larger guard
bands toward the center and narrow ones toward the outside
of the distribution.
To obtain the variable guard bands, we ﬁrst approximate
the probability of traversing the guard band of width g as a
function of the a-priori probability near the border2where p(x)
is the channel density. From this equation, we can solve for
the width g to obtain
Ptrav ∼ p(x) · 1
2
erfc
g√
2σn
, (5)
g ∼
√
2σnerfc−1
[
k · Ptrav
p(x)
]
, (6)
where k is a constant which will be modiﬁed to obtain different
widths. Since k is only a constant, we can incorporate Ptrav in
it and simplify the expression above to ﬁnd
g ∼
√
2σnerfc−1[k/p(x)] . (7)
This depends on the noise variance and the channel density.
One might realize that we ignored the effect of the number
of nearest neighbors. The reason for ignoring the effect is
similar to error performance curves in general. In the region
of interest, they are so steep that a small factor of two to four
will not have an effect on the SNR. Here, we also have the
erfc function in (5) which has this behavior and hence the
inﬂuence on the guard band width g is negligible in the range
of interest.
For our practical implementation, for the complex chan-
nel gain measurements, we used a discretization to a two-
dimensional discrete grid from −3.5 to 3.5 in I and Q with
2
√
2 results from assuming one side to be noise-free and hence the other
to experience twice the variance.
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Fig. 2. Guard band construction for codebook size 32, wide bands
Fig. 3. Guard band construction for codebook size 32, narrow bands
a bin-size of 0.005. We refer to these scales throughout this
paper.
For each limiting threshold, we choose 10 equally spaced
points at which we computed the guard band widths.
For simplicity, in (7), we used the absolute count within
bins for p(x) which is easily possible, since k is chosen
accordingly. Hence, the later speciﬁed values for k should be
regarded in a relative sense, only. Note that a bigger k means
a narrower guard band.
For too small values of the count of samples near to the
quantization limits, we chose to set the guard band width to
zero, which is visible from ﬁgures 2 and 3.
V. RESULTS
This section presents the results obtained for the RECAP
scenario with one seed and 24 reconﬁgurable elements, which
has been shown in [15] to result in a Gaussian-like channel
distribution. Figures 2 and 3 show the result obtained for
the guard bands construction for a size 32 codebook3. The
values for the noise variance and for k are chosen such that
two extreme scenarios are depicted: very wide guard bands,
covering to a great extent the encoding regions in the center
of the distribution, and very narrow guard bands close to the
actual Voronoi boundaries.
Intuitively, each encoding region occupies a smaller area and
the high probability center regions become to a great extent
unusable for very wide guard bands. Moreover, considering
that the guard band width is proportional to the standard
deviation, the maximum value of allowed noise variance is
more limited for larger codebook sizes. However, one should,
of course, note, that for bigger codebook sizes N also result
in higher number of key bits log2N .
We can observe the contraction of the guard band width at low
densities of the complex channel gain, which is even nearer
to the center of the distribution for higher values of k. This is
visible from Fig. 3 4.
To evaluate the performance for different noise variances as
well as for different widths (controlled by k), we performed
simulations to obtain the error probability and the efﬁciency.
While the error probability represents the probability to cross
the guard band and end up in another quantization region,
the efﬁciency is deﬁned by the probability to obtain valid
keys. To determine the error probability, we consider the data
points deﬁning our distribution and disturb each one of them
by two independent AWGN values with zero-mean and desired
noise variance. This allows us to simulate the exact scenarios
describing Alice and Bob. The received quantized values are
further compared and either accounted for hitting the guard
bands, if either one of the received values belongs to the
guard band region, or counted for the error probability, if the
two received values are different. The efﬁciency can then be
obtained after subtracting the probability to end up in the guard
band and the error probability from the maximum probability
of 1.
Figures 4 and 5 provide the efﬁciency and the error prob-
ability results for a codebook of size 32, for different noise
variances and the allowed range of k for each scenario. As
one could already anticipate, higher noise levels together with
small k lead to very broad guard bands, ﬁnally starting to cover
the inner area with high probabilities completely, essentially
making some codebook entries disappear. This is, of course,
more predominantly the case for larger codebook sizes.
Furthermore, we observe that for constant σ2n, decreasing
k results in lower efﬁciency as well as lower probability of
error. This is to be understood since, as we decrease k, we
increase the guard band width, which ensures on the one hand
that there is a lower probability to have a key error and, on the
other hand, that as the area covered by guard bands increases,
the efﬁciency decreases. This trade-off can be seen in ﬁgures
3For space limitations, results for other codebook sizes cannot be included.
4One might zoom into the color pdf to recognize it well!
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4 and 5; a very high efﬁciency is achieved at the expense of a
very high error probability. A somewhat irregular behavior at
low error probabilities in Fig. 5 is due to limiting the number
of investigated samples.
Examining the same plots, another important observation
can be made. When the value of k is ﬁxed and the noise
variance changes, the probability of success changes quite
noticeably while the probability of error does not change so
much. For example, increasing σ2n results in visibly lower ef-
ﬁciency and slowly increasing error probability. This behavior
can be understood when arguing the impact that the guard
band width increase has on the two performance indicators.
While the efﬁciently is directly affected by the guard-band
width g proportional to σn according to (7), the guard bands
are constructed to roughly preserve the error probability (Ptrav
in Eq. (6)). However, the simpliﬁed derivation only considers
areas near to the boundary, which causes a slight dependence
on the noise level.
Overall, we realize a signiﬁcant drop in efﬁciency when
requiring low error rates. Assuming an error rate of 10−7,
from Fig. 5, one would obtain a k of around 3 · 10−4. Picking
the σ2n = 5 ·10−4 curve in Fig. 4 would result in an efﬁciency
of slightly above 0.4. The corresponding SNR is around 33
dB, which is already pretty high.
The error rate can only be reduced or the efﬁciency in-
creased by choosing smaller codebook sizes (leading to less
bits per channel measurement) or, possibly, by moving to
Slepian-Wolf type LDPC coding schemes [14], [16], which
also requires more redundancy for reconciliation with larger
codebook sizes. One should, however, note that the quantiza-
tion causes adverse channel conditions that are not yet taken
into account in [14]. One has to, at least, modify the intrinsic
information or better take the quantization effect already into
account in the code design.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the possibility to introduce adap-
tive guard bands instead of quantization thresholds to support
the key reconciliation process. We investigated scenarios with
different codebook sizes, for different noise conditions, and
width realizations. The evaluation has been done using the
efﬁciency and the error probability as performance indica-
tors. We realized that the efﬁciency is, of course, reduced
for low error rates and bigger codebook sizes. Depending
on the actual relation between channel gain measurements
and noise/crosstalk environment, one may possibly go for
codebook sizes smaller than 32 that was shown as an example
in this paper. Another option is available through Slepian-Wolf
coding [14] or making use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem
[17].
Future works will provide results for guard band concept
and Slepian-Wolf coding for RECAP line-of-sight channels
with also fewer numbers of reconﬁgurable elements and there-
fore different non-Gaussian distributions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is funded by the German Research Foundation
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG).
Fig. 4. Efﬁciency for codebook size 32
Fig. 5. Error probability for codebook size 32
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